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Abstract—Most cryptosystems are defined over finite algebraic
structures where arithmetic operations are performed modulo
natural numbers. This applies to private key as well as to public
key ciphers. No secure cryptosystems defined over the field of
real numbers are known. In this work, we demonstrate the
feasibility of constructing secure symmetric key ciphers defined
over the field of real numbers. We consider the security of
ciphers introduced in a previous work and based on solving
linear and non-linear equations numerically. We complement
the design of those ciphers to satisfy the requirements of secure
systems and, consequently, extend them into composite ciphers
with multiple encryptions. We show security enhancements by
estimating the uncertainty in finding the keys using a measure
based on Shannon’s entropy function.
Index Terms—Symmetric key ciphers over real numbers,
secure communication, product ciphers, shannon’s security mea-
sure
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography literature indicates that all known
cryptosystems are defined over algebraic structures with
finite sets. The order of these sets must be sufficiently large
so as to make an exhaustive search (or brute-force attack) in
the key space impractical. Both private key (symmetric) and
public key (asymmetric) cryptosystems share this feature.
In addition, symmetric key cipher design must follow
information theoretic principles to hide the internal structure
of the encryption scheme, and, for public key ciphers,
one-way trapdoor functions defined over finite structures are
required; see for example, [7], [11], [15] and [16], to name a
few.
No cryptosystems defined over real numbers and
implemented using floating point representations are known
to be secure. Bergamo et al. [1] refer to examples of insecure
symmetric key cryptosysyems based on chaotic maps.
The authors also show that the public key cryptosystems
of Kocarev and Tasev [6] based on chaos theory and
use Chebyshev polynomials defined over real numbers
are insecure. Due to the finite precision of the floating
point representations of real numbers, rounding errors are
unavoidable. For this reason, Kocarev and Tasev suggest
upper bounds on numeric inputs to ensure the validity of the
semi-group property of Chebychev polynomials, required to
establish the public key protocol. On the other hand, finding
a one-way trapdoor function over the field of real numbers
similar to the function defined over the multiplicative group
of a finite field, f(x) = gx (mod p), and known as the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), seems to be difficult.
In symmetric key cryptography finding a one-way trapdoor
function is not required and in case the design of encryption
schemes allows rounding errors without loss of protocol
correctness, it is possible to construct secure symmetric
key cryptosystems over real numbers. The purpose of the
current work is to demonstrate the construction of secure
symmetric ciphers defined over the field of real numbers.
Cryptosystems based on real numeric root-finding methods
have been introduced by the author in [3]. We address the
security of these cryptosystems and extend them into multiple
encryption product ciphers to meet the requirements of
secure communications suggested by Shannon in his seminal
work on communication theory of secrecy systems [14].
To this end, we consider a security measure based on the
entropy function proposed by Shannon in his earlier work
on the theory of communication [13], and use this measure
to estimate the security gained due to the addition of extra
encryptions.
The contribution of this work can be summarized as follows:
• it extends the conference paper in :
i) describing the proposed encryption schemes in more
details
ii) extending the encryption schemes into multiple en-
cryption systems (product ciphers)
iii) addressing the security of the product ciphers against
ciphertext only attack and against known plaintext
attack
iv) estimating the gained security by defining a security
measure based on Shannon’s entropy function
• it demonstrates the feasibility of constructing secure
symmetric key ciphers over the field of real numbers
• it conjectures that a symmetric key cipher based on
solving a system of linear equations and defined over the
field of real numbers is secure against ciphertext only
attack
• it shows that security of symmetric key ciphers defined
over the real field depends solely on the size of key
space, that is, on the precision and range of floating point
representations of real numbers
• it indicates that with appropriate software libraries, arbi-
trary precision is possible and, therefore, the key space
size can be made arbitrarily large, thus allowing secure
symmetric key ciphers over the field of real numbers
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2This work is organized as follows: the next section (II)
introduces the two private key ciphers based on numerical
methods. Section (III) addresses the security features of the
proposed encryption schemes. In Section (IV), the encryption
schemes are extended to cascading cryptosystems involving
multiple substitution and transposition operations. Section (V)
estimates the security gain due to the addition of extra en-
cryptions, and, finally, Section (VI) concludes the paper with
a summary and future research directions.
II. CRYPTOSYSTEMS DEFINED OVER R
In this section, two encryption schemes defined over R
and based on employing numerical methods are described [3].
The first is a substitution n-block cipher (n > 1) based on
solving a system of n linear equations. The second is a one-
character block cipher and is based on solving single non-
linear equations numerically.
A. Cipher based on solving a set of linear equations
The key consists of n-vector (bi) and an n×n matrix (aij).
Here, n represents the block-length. Encrypting a block of n
characters, represented by vector (ci), is achieved by solving
the following system of linear equations:
n∑
j=1
aijxj = bi − ci (1)
Provided that (aij) is invertible, solution vectors (x∗i ) exist;
each represents a block of n ciphertext entries. The condition
on (aij) guarantees that the encryption function is bijective
and, consequently, has an inverse- the decryption function.
Decrypting the ciphered text is achieved by subsequently
substituting solution vectors into Equation (1) giving rise to
ci = bi −
∑n
j=1 aijx
∗
j . One may re-write Equation 1 in an
equivalent form:
n∑
k=1
aik × xkj = bi − cij (2)
where (xkj) represents the ciphertext; it is an (n × m)
matrix with m columns representing blocks, each of which is
of size n. The (n × m) matrix (cij) represents the plaintext
of (nm) characters; matrix cij makes dividing the plaintext
into blocks, each of size n, explicit.
The following example serves to explain the encryption
scheme by comparing it to a similar classical substitution
cipher, namely, the Hill-cipher [4]. Consider a 2 × 2 matrix
key and a constant vector defined as follows:
A =
(
2 3
1 4
)
and b =
( −3
2
)
.
Let “epic” be part of a plaintext. The ascii code of this part
can be written in matrix form as (cij) =
(
101 105
112 99
)
.
The solution of the linear Equations (2) can then be
written as xij = (a−1)ik × (bk − ckj), where (a−1)ik
is the inverse matrix, (a−1)ik = 15
(
4 −3
−1 2
)
, and
(x∗)ij =
( −17.2 −28.2
−23.2 −17.2
)
represents the ciphertext
matrix. To decrypt and recover the plaintext matrix (cij), we
substitute (x∗)ij in Equation 2.
In implementing the Hill cipher the finite ring Z26 is used,
where all arithmetic operations are performed modulo 26.
We remark that equivalent results will be obtained if the
infinite real field R, employed in applying our algorithm
in the previous paragraph, is used instead. To encrypt we
calculate aik × ckj (mod 26) and obtain the ciphertext matrix
yij =
(
18 13
3 7
)
. To decrypt, we calculate the inverse
of A (mod 26), A−1 =
(
6 15
5 16
)
, and multiply by the
ciphertext matrix modulo 26
cij = (a
−1)ik×ykj =
(
23 1
8 21
)
≡
(
101 105
112 99
)
(mod 26)
B. Cipher based on solving non-linear equations
The key is a non-linear function with one variable f(x).
The encryption function is defined as finding a solution of the
equation:
f(x)− ci = 0 (3)
Here, (ci) represents the numerical code of the ith character
in the plaintext, e.g., the ascii-code. To guarantee that the
encryption function has an inverse, numerical encoding of
plaintext together with f(x) must be chosen in such a way
that equation (3) has at least one real root. The roots {x∗i }
represent the ciphertext. On the recipient side, each entry
(x∗i ) is decrypted by substituting it into f(x), giving rise to
the plaintext character ci = f(x∗i ). We remark that f(x
∗
i )
must be appropriately rounded to recover ci.
For example, given f(x) = 2(x
2−x) as key, encrypting
“epic” amounts to solving, one at a time, four non-linear
equations numerically:
2(x
2− x2 ) − ci = 0 (4)
where ci takes the values: 101, 112, 105 and 99. As a result,
we get the following ciphertext using the Secant method:
{x∗i } = {−2.842433505.., 2.871040808.., 2.853218300.., 2.836862311..}
When those roots are substituted in 4, we recover the real
values of ci : 101.00..0, 112.00..0, 105.00..0 and 99.00..0
coinciding with the ascii code up to at least twelve decimal
places.
III. SECURITY OF THE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
In this section, security features of the encryption schemes
introduced in the previous section are considered. Kerchoff’s
Principle is assumed, that is, the specification of the encryption
3algorithm is known but the key is unknown.
There are two ways to break a private key cipher. One
way is to try all possible alternatives; the so-called exhaustive
search or brute-force attack. This technique is guaranteed to
succeed, but it is impractical if the key space is sufficiently
large The second class of techniques is based on making
use of the internal structure of the cipher; for example, as to
how plaintext character blocks are mapped or encrypted into
ciphertext symbols. Such information helps the adversary
choose the most effective attack method.
Contemporary symmetric key ciphers, invented post 1970s,
follow Shannon’s two design principles of secure encryp-
tion [14]: confusion and diffusion. Contemporary ciphers are
composite cryptosystems in which substitution is combined
with transposition several times; substitution adds confusion
to the encryption process and transposition adds diffusion.
Examples of design strategies underlying remarkable contem-
porary symmetric cipherse may explain how Shannon’s design
requirements are satisfied:
1) Apply Feistel function (16 times) consisting of various
operations, including expansion, key addition, S-Box
substitution, P-Box permutation, and XOR, e.g., DES of
the National Institute of Standards (US) [9]
2) Employ three operations: modular addition, bit rotation
and XOR, e.g., RC5, suggested by R. L. Rivest [12]
3) Mix two operations: a substitution and a permutation
over finite fields, e.g., AES of the National Institute of
Standards (US) [8]
With the design principles of Shannon’s information the-
ory, plaintext letters frequency distributions are diffused and,
therefore, attacks based on statistical analysis of ciphertexts,
given the statistical properties of the underlying language,
fail. Diffusion breaks monoalphabetic 1-to-1 correspondence
between plaintext and ciphertext. Next, we consider different
attack models on the proposed encryption schemes and discuss
their robustness.
A. Ciphertext only attack
In this attack model, the adversary possesses only a copy of
the ciphertext. Our cipher design based on solving a system
of linear equations, Equation (2), does not preserve plaintext
letters frequency distributions, it is a polyalphabetic cryptosys-
tem as the Hill cipher, and, therefore, statistical analysis using
plaintext language redundancies is meaningless. According to
Stinson [16], the Hill cipher is known to be hard to break in
the ciphertext only attack model. The complexity of breaking
the cipher can be evaluated by calculating the size of the key
space. The size of the key space of Hill cipher with (n×n) key
matrix defined over finite ring Zm has been found by Overbey
et al. [10]:
Theorem 1. (Overbey et al. Hill Cipher Keyspace Size The-
orem)
The number of (n × n) matrices invertible mod m = ∏i pkii
is
|GL(n,Zm)| =
∏
i
(p
(ki−1)n2
i
n−1∏
j=0
(pni − pji ))
Where GL(n,Zm) represents the group of (n×n) matrices
invertible over Zm. With m = 2 × 13, the size of the key
space will be:
26n
2
(1− 1
2
) . . . (1− 1
2n−1
)(1− 1
2n
)(1− 1
13
)(1− 1
132
) . . . (1− 1
13n
)
An exhaustive search requires 26n
2
matrix multiplications.
Our cipher possesses a key space of a size bounded by the
precision of the floating point representation of real numbers.
For example, the IEEE 754-1985 standard for binary floating
point arithmetic [5], implemented by most compilers, and
in particular the GCC compiler, defines an effective double-
precision floating point range of ±(2− 2−52)× 21023 with 52
bits of accuracy. This amounts to a range of ≈ 308 decimal
digits with ≈ 16 decimal digits of accuracy. We remark
that arbitrary precision can be achieved using appropriate
libraries, e.g., the MPFR library. Therefore, an exhaustive
search can be made practically impossible.
We conjecture that the cipher based on solving the system,
Equation (2), defined over real numbers with double-precision
floating point representation is secure in the ciphertext attack
model.
The cipher based on solving non-linear equations numer-
ically, Equation (3), is monoalphabetic and, therefore, is
vulnerable against attacks based on statistical analysis using
plaintext letters frequency distributions.
B. Known plaintext attack
In this attack model the adversary possesses a copy of (or
a part) of the plaintext as well as a copy of the corresponding
ciphertext. In the following, we denote plaintext characters
by {ci} and their corresponding ciphertext symbols by {x∗i }.
Here, every ci corresponds to an ascii-code and every x∗i to
a real number and i ranges over the size l of (a part of) the
plaintext.
The encryption scheme based on solving a system of linear
equations (2) is completely linear and, therefore, vulnerable
against known plaintext attacks. If the dimension (n) of
the key matrix (aij) is known, a data set consisting of an
(n + 1)2 (ci, x
∗
i ) pairs is sufficient to establish a system of
linear equations whose solution is the key matrix elements
(aij) and (bi).
As indicated, the encryption scheme based on solving
non-linear equation (3) is monoalphabetic; there is a 1-to-1
correspondence from a subset of ascii-codes to a subset of R
implying that the (x∗i ) entries in data set (x
∗
i , ci = f(x
∗
i ))
are distinct for distinct (ci) entries, where i ∈ [0..n] and n
represents the plaintext size. With such a data set, it is possible
to approximate the key function f(x) to a polynomial function
4p(x) of degree ≤ number of distinct printable ascii characters.
The existence of p(x) is guaranteed by the following theorem
due to Weierstrass [2]:
Theorem 2. (Weierstrass approximation Theorem) Suppose
that f(x) is defined and continuous on [a, b]. For each  > 0,
there exists a polynomial p(x), with the property that |f(x)−
p(x)| < , for all x ∈ [a, b].
Given a data set, a unique polynomial p(x) can be con-
structed using interpolation. The construction procedure de-
pends on the basis polynomials of the vector space of dimen-
sion equals degree of p(x) + 1.
IV. APPLYING SHANNON’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES
As mentioned in Section III, contemporary symmetric
ciphers are composite systems which combine a multiple of
substitution and transposition operations in the encryption
process to achieve reasonable security levels. In the same
section, we indicated that the proposed ciphers are restricted
to substitution, and therefore, do not conform to Shannon’s
principles of secure encryption.
To improve security, we may extend the proposed en-
cryption schemes into multiple encryption systems (product
ciphers) by concatenating them to an arbitrary number of
other block ciphers with independent keys. The following
examples are restricted to extending the proposed schemes
up to a maximum of three stages; they should serve as a
proof of concept, that is, to demonstrate the feasibility of
constructing secure symmetric ciphers defined over the field
of real numbers.
A. Product cipher with solving linear equations
A 2-stage product cipher combining the proposed sub-
stitution cipher based on solving systems of linear equa-
tions (2) with an independent transposition cipher would add
the required diffusion to the encryption process. This would
enhance the security against known plaintext attacks referred
to in the previous paragraph. Symbolically, the product cipher
encryption function can be expressed as follows:
(ektr ◦ eklin)(ci) = ektr (eklin(ci))) = xi (5)
The reverse operation (decryption) follows a reverse order
and can be symbolically expressed as:
(dklin ◦ dktr )(xi) = dklin(dktr (xi))) = ci (6)
Here, ektr and eklin represent, respectively, transposition
encryption function and the encryption function based on
solving system of linear equations (2). The symbols dktr and
dklin represent, respectively, the corresponding decryption
functions, i.e., reversing transposition and using the roots
obtained to regain plaintext characters.
In implementing the first stage of the encryption process,
eklin , the matrices (aij) and (bi) are read from a text file and
the root set {x∗i } was calculated by finding the inverse matrix
of equations (2) using the formula
A−1 =
1
det(A)
adj(A)
where det(A) denotes the determinant of A and adj(A) is
the adjoint matrix.
Input: ciphertextin generated by solving n linear equations
Output: ciphertextout
Let fp denote file pointer
file size ← calculate size of ciphertextin
if (file size) even, then file size/2 ← j
else add a space char, (file size+ 1)/2 ← j;
0 ← i; 0 ← k;
while (i < file size) && !eof(ciphertextlin))
read(ai) from input file;
write(ai) in output file;
inc(k); inc(i);
if (ai == EOF ) then break;
else move fp to j, read(aj), write(aj), inc(j), inc(i), move
fp to k;
end
end
Fig. 1. Transposition algorithm
In transposing the encryptions generated by solving systems
of linear equations, we follow the algorithm shown in Figure 1.
Figures 2 and 3 show an example of the confusion and
diffusion effects due to the two encryption operations on part
of a plaintext whose ascii-code is:
087101032097114101032116104101032
099104097109112115013010013010032
Figure 2 depicts the ciphertext resulting from the 1st stage
of the encryption process, that is, from solving a set of
ten linear equations simultaneously. Figure 3 is the result of
applying the transposition algorithm on this ciphertext; the 2nd
stage of the encryption process. The matrix key employed in
the first stage is the following arbitrarily chosen (10 × 10)
matrix (aij):
1 -1 -5 0.5 -20 0 0.4 10 0.25 86
3 -1 0 2 -3 -12 52 1 0 -0.1
0 23 9 9 3 34 -14 7 9 -8
1 -9 67 -2 -5 8 20 2 0.1 45
-2 23 0 9 0 34 0.12 4 3 -4
0.4 11 1 0 1 0 0.15 -0.8 89 -1
20 0.2 -15 23 -2 1 -10 9 23 0.45
0.5 -3 0.1 -30 -0.8 -3 -12 12 -11 0.30
-1 -2 2 21 9 -0.5 35 -3 -0.1 -1
3 0 -1 -0.1 11 0 -2 7 9 0.8
The constant bj vector is chosen to be:
(−10 2 27 − 1 90 0.2 − 4 12 30 − 0.5)T
-9343.900391 -1072.250000 -6781.200195 -5534.299805 -6628.520020 -7563.500000
-6515.274414 3477.149902 -2777.700195 -1943.399902 -442.599976 -5014.049805
-5717.200195 -7918.899902 -6734.479980 596.650024 -397.275085 4744.850098
-6241.600098 152.000000
Fig. 2. Ciphertext from 1st stage (solving lin eqns) of encryption process
5-33909 17.500-71209 53.985-68502 76.000-55241 47190 27.015-93390 42597 51.485
-77209 71.992-74498 9.504-9.70544.508-21609 5.00094.031-02200 68.015-54290
62.200-53500 61.74437.492-77709 14.992-4.996-04090 51.015-98890 63.79056602
37258 74809 64.00812000
Fig. 3. Ciphertext from 2nd stage (transposition) of encryption process
Input: ciphertexttr due to transposition cipher
Output: ciphertextlin
Let fp denote file pointer
file size ← calculate size of ciphertexttr
if (file size) even then file size/2 ← j
else add a space char, (file size+ 1)/2 ← j;
0 ← i; j ←l
while (i < l && j < file size)
read ai; /* ai denotes a ciphertexttr element */
write ai in ciphertextlin;
inc(i);
move fp to position j;
read aj ; write aj in ciphertextlin; inc(j);
move fp to position i;
end
if (i < l) then read ai; write ai in ciphertextlin;
end
Fig. 4. Inverse transposition algorithm
The inverse decryption process proceeds with reversing the
transposition process (dktr (xi)), that is, applying the inverse
transposition algorithm of Figure 4. This operation recovers
the ciphertext of roots generated by solving the system of
linear equation 2. The roots are then substituted into the linear
equations thus recovering the plaintext characters ci. Figure 5
shows the result of the 2nd stage of decrypting process, i.e.,
inserting the roots of the ciphertext into the linear equations to
get the ascii-code. The resulting real numbers must be rounded
to recover the plaintext.
87.000114 101.000092 32.000019 97.000038 113.999611 100.999565 31.999895
116.000237 104.000084 100.999886 32.000282 99.000137 103.999985 97.000183
108.999832 111.999611 114.999886 13.000096 10.000035 12.999951
Fig. 5. Ciphertext from 2nd stage of decryption process
Fig. 6. Average enc/dec times of product cipher
A correlation analysis of the encryption/decryption time ver-
sus the size of plaintext of the product cryptosystem combining
solving systems of linear equations and transposition reveals a
linear model with correlation coefficients: renc = 0.9876 and
rdec = 0.9832. Figure 6 exhibits the linear correlations. The
sizes of plaintext samples were: 21, 1036, 2024, 4658, 6218,
9830, 18552, 31081, 39674, 60173 bytes and the matrix key
was arbitrarily taken to be a 3× 3 matrix.
B. Product cipher with solving non-linear equations
In the following, a 3-stage product cipher resulting from
concatenating our encryption function based on solving
equation (3) with the Vigene`re cipher and with a transposition
cipher is constructed. Adding the Vigene`re and transposition
operations breaks the “monoalphabetic” link between
ciphertext and plaintext (the input) by spreading out plaintext
redundancy over entire ciphertext.
The triple encryption cryptosystem is a product cipher
whose encryption function can be symbolically expressed as
follows:
(ektr ◦ ekvig ◦ eknlin)(ci) = ektr (ekvig (eknlin(ci))) = xi (7)
where ektr represents the transposition function, ekvig repre-
sents the Vigene`re encryption function with kvig as keyword,
ekbis represents the encryption function based on solving
equation (3) with knlin representing the non-linear function
f(x), and ci is the ith plaintext character with xi being
the corresponding ciphered character. The inverse decryption
function follows a reverse order, namely,
(dknlin ◦dkvig ◦dktr )(xi) = dknlin(dkvig (dktr (xi))) = ci (8)
where dktr (xi) represents the transposition inverse, dkvig (xi)
represents the Vigene`re decryption function which recovers
the root x∗i generated by solving the corresponding non-linear
equation with key function knlin. dknlin(xi) represents the
decryption function, by which the root xi is substituted into
the non-linear equation to recover the plaintext character ci.
We apply the three encryption operations on the same
(part of) plaintext with the ascii-code given in the previous
section. Figure 7 shows the ciphertext resulting from the first
encryption operation (eknlin ) based on solving the following
non-linear equation numerically using the Bisection method:
x5 + 7.34x4 + 22.03x3 + 46.012x2 + 12.25x− 1− ci = 0
0.996905152715 1.062095760863 0.632444388903 1.044151171664 1.117163734307
1.062095760863 0.632444388903 1.125235020154 1.075229083508 1.062095760863
0.632444388903 1.053187075449 1.075229083508 1.044151171664 1.096536606346
1.108991331275 1.121211836726 0.402103486558 0.350298562407 0.402103486558
Fig. 7. Ciphertext from 1st stage (solving non-lin eqn) of encryption process
The Vigene`re encryption keyword (kvig) takes the form of
an array of real numbers of a certain length, keyword[]. The
Vigene`re cipher adds, in order, each root arising from the first
6encryption operation (Figure 7) to an array element in the
keyword, yi = x∗i + keyword[i]. Depending on the length of
the keyword compared to the length of the ciphertext, the same
roots will be, with high probability, assigned different encryp-
tion values, thus breaking the 1-to-1 correspondence between
plaintext letters and ciphertext real roots. Figure 8 depicts the
10 entries of Vigene`re’s keyword used in encrypting the roots.
Figure 9 lists the ciphertext elements generated by applying
the Vigene`re cipher to the roots using the keyword of Figure 8.
We remark that the 1-to-1 link has been eliminated; equal roots
do not anymore correspond to equal ciphertext elements.
8.27409124359 3.44876404589 2.84907100186 1.27800971542 4.90898111008
5.46406511234 0.21409875231 7.19061419871 2.38408754321 3.12908182363
Fig. 8. Vigene`re’s cipher keyword of length 10
9.270995914936 4.510859847069 3.481515407562 2.322160959244 6.026145100594
6.526160836220 0.846543133259 8.315849184990 3.459316611290 4.191177487373
8.906535148621 4.501951217651 3.924300074577 2.322160959244 6.005517959595
6.573056459427 1.335310637951 7.592717707157 2.734386116266 3.531185209751
Fig. 9. The ciphertext generated after applying the Vigene`re cipher
The third and last encryption operation due to transposition
(ektr ) is applied to the ciphertext of Figure 9 as input using
an implementation of the algorithm depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 10 depicts the ciphertext.
9209943 .1894093411476 .2105246064109 .2103200864135 .1898903491619
.9178338-963182 .0911613940047 .2105246051999 .7065471351675
.9770172748166 .315071-.7951964505876 .8550522326994 .2150546566862
.4533298354149 .5361204117477 .0554614515275 .2307572326994
.0575556535492 .3303917521775 .3361263518295
Fig. 10. The ciphertext generated after applying the transposition cipher
The inverse decryption process proceeds with reversing
the transposition process (dktr (xi))) applied to the last
ciphertext generated by the transposition operation-Figure 10
as input. This operation must result in the ciphertext of
Figure 9, i.e., that generated by applying Vigene`re’s cipher
in the encryption process. To decipher this text we subtract,
in order, each real value (yi) from the corresponding array
element of Vigene`re’s keyword of Figure 8. In this way the
roots arising from the first encryption operation are recovered,
x∗i = yi − keyword[i]. The roots are then substituted in the
polynomial function to recover the plaintext characters ci.
Fig. 11. Average enc/dec times of product cipher
Following the correlation analysis of data performed in
Section IV-A, a similar analysis of the encryption/decryption
times versus the size of plaintext of the product cryptosystem
combining solving non-linear single equations, Vigene`re ci-
pher and transposition operation reveals a linear correlation
with coefficients: renc = 0.9998 and rdec = 0.9988 (See
Figure 11). The linear correlation of the cipher based on solv-
ing non-linear equations numerically persists in the product
cipher with greater response times. This behavior shows that
the encryption/decryption times due to Vigene`re encipherment
together with the transposition cipher, increase linearly with
the size of plaintext.
V. ESTIMATING THE GAINED SECURITY
In this section we use Shannon’s probabilistic approach to
estimate the security gained by extending our cryptosystems
into product ciphers against ciphertext only attacks. We
start with a brief introduction to the basic concepts of this
approach required to define a security measure.
A cryptosystem is represented as 5-tuple
(P, C,K, eK(), dK()), where P represents the set of possible
plaintexts (single letters of the alphabet of the underlying
plaintext language), C the set possible ciphertexts, K the set
of possible keys, eK() the set of possible encryption functions
with K being a random variable which takes values in K
according to a (possibly uniform) probability distribution, and
dK() represents the corresponding decryption functions.
Shannon [13] defined the entropy function as a measure
of uncertainty (in bit length) in the following way. Given a
random variable X with probability distribution p(X), the
entropy H(X) is:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(X = xi) log2(p(X = xi)) (9)
Here, xi represents all possible values of X and (finite) n
being the size of the sample space on which X is defined.
7We remark that the maximum value (H(X) = log2(n)) is
reached in case p(X) is uniform, i.e., p(X = xi) = 1n for
all i, and the minimum value (H(X) = 0) in case one single
X-value is certain, i.e., p(X = xi0) = 1 and p(X = xi) = 0
for all i 6= i0.
Key equivocation will be used as a measure of security;
it is a conditional entropy expression of the form H(K|C)
and measures the average uncertainty remaining about the key
when a ciphertext has been observed. One can show that,
following Stinson [16]:
H(K|Cn) = H(K) +H(Pn)−H(Cn) (10)
where Pn represents the random variable that has as its
probability distribution all n-grams of plaintext alphabet, Cn
is a random variable with a probability distribution being all
n-grams of ciphertext symbols and K the random variable
with a uniform probability distribution.
In case P represents the alphabet of a natural language (L),
one can show that H(Pn) ≈ nHL, where HL represents the
entropy of a single letter. For English, HE ≈ 1.25. Also, as
the upper bound on entropy H(X) of a random variable X
taking l values x1, x2, . . . , xl with any probability distribution
p(X) is log2(l), we have H(C
n) ≤ n log2(|C|). Putting these
results in (10), we get, following Stinson [16]:
H(K|Cn) ≥ H(K) + nHL − n log2(|C|) (11)
In case P does not correspond to a natural language, the
language redundancy is zero, e.g., the set of digits, and if
|P| = |C| and we assume that the probability distributions of
Pn and of Cn are the same, then H(Pn)−H(Cn) = 0 and,
therefore, equation 10 reduces to
H(K|Cn) = H(K) (12)
Equation (12) tells us that in case the plaintext language has
no redundancy, that is, all its symbols are equally probable,
there is no information about the key that can be conveyed by
the ciphertext n-gram, and, therefore, the uncertainty about the
key is entirely determined by the size of the key space. Next
we use this result to estimate the security gained by adding
Vigene`re and transposition encryptions.
A. Product cipher with solving linear equations
As indicated in Section III-A, the size of the space of
our cryptosystem based on solving a set of linear equations
simultaneously is infinite; there are infinite number of
invertible square matrices over R. This makes exhaustive
search much harder than the case of Hill cipher defined over
a finite field.
As for the additional uncertainty in finding the key added
by applying the transposition cipher, we have H(Ktr|Cn) =
H(Ktr), since the transposition is a mapping from R into
R. If block length n is even and we apply the transposition
encryption algorithm Figure 1, the size of key space is
|Ktr| = (n2 ) ! Therefore, H(Ktr) = log2(n2 ) ! ≈ n2 log2( n2e )+
log2
√
pin is the additional key uncertainty gained by applying
transposition. For n = 100, the gained uncertainty is ≈ 214.2
bits.
B. Product cipher with solving non-linear equations
The cryptosystem of Section IV-B consists of three
encryption stages. We start with the last stage, where
transposition encryption is applied on the ciphertext, a
string of real numbers, produced from the second stage, the
Vigene`re encryption. As indicated in the previous section,
with n being (even) length of the ciphertext due to Vigene`re’s
encryption. The additional uncertainty in finding the key is:
H(Ktr) = log2(
n
2 ) ! ≈ n2 log2( n2e ) + log2
√
pin
At the second stage the Vigene`re encryption is applied
to the ciphertext consisting of the real roots of non-linear
equations; it is a mapping from R into R, in which case
H(K|Cn) = H(K). Let the length of the keyword- a string
of digits, be k. The size of the key space will be |Kvig| = 10k.
Therefore, H(Kvig) = log2(10
k) = k log2(10)
At the first stage the encryption is monoalphabetic and
we discard its contribution to the overall security of the
cryptosystem. The key space of the third and the second
encryptions is the product of both spaces, and, therefore, the
gained uncertainty of the system is the sum
H(Ktr) +H(Kvig) ≈ n
2
log2(
n
2e
) + log2
√
pin+ k log2(10)
For n = 100 and k=20, the gained uncertainty amounts to
≈ 217.5 bits.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated that it is possible to build secure
symmetric key cryptosystems over the field of real numbers.
The starting point was encryption schemes based on root-
finding numerical methods. The designs of these schemes
is restricted to substitution, and, therefore, do not satisfy
Shannon’s principles of secure communication.
We applied Shannon’s security principles and extended the
proposed schemes into multiple encryption product ciphers.
With this extension, the resulting ciphers become similar to
contemporary symmetric ciphers such as DES and AES, with
the difference that the latter ciphers are defined over finite
fields, whereas ours are defined over the field of real numbers.
However, implementing the ciphers on a computing machine
with finite memory sets upper and lower bounds on the size of
the real field; these bounds are determined by the range and
the precision of floating point representations of real numbers.
A security measure based on Shannon’s entropy function is
used to estimate security against ciphertext only attacks gained
by adding more encryptions, like Vigene`re and transposition
operations. As parts of the multi-stage encryption process,
these encryptions are mappings from the set of reals R into
itself. With such mappings, there is no redundancy in the
8source (plaintext) language and the probability distributions
of source and ciphertext languages are equal. As a result, the
uncertainty of finding the corresponding keys depends only
on the size of the key space, which, as noted, depends on the
range and precision of floating point representations of real
numbers. We indicated that arbitrary precision can be achieved
using appropriate software libraries and, therefore, the key
space size can be made arbitrarily large. This meant that
exhaustive search in the key space can be made practically
impossible, thus enhancing the security of our product ciphers.
Following the demonstrations presented in this work, future
research will concentrate on building secure large scale (in-
dustrial) symmetric key cryptosystems defined over the field
of real numbers.
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